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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between economic and social development. Contrary to the view of
those who believe in the existence of a tradeoff between democracy and growth, the paper contends that
consensus-building, open dialog and the promotion of an active civil society are key ingredients to long-
term sustainable development. Development is a participatory process. “Best practices” or reforms that are
imposed on a country through conditionality may very well fail to produce lasting change. They will tend to
undermine people’s incentives to develop their own capacities and weaken their confidence in using their
own intelligence. Success in a knowledge-based economy requires a highly-educated citizenry, involved in
the process of shaping and adapting ideas and policies. Participation and democracy in turn call for greater
transparency and accountability in both the corporate and government sectors.
1. Introduction
The relationship between democracy and development has long been debated. In the
years immediately following World War II, there was a belief (articulated, for instance,
in Paul Samuelson’s classic textbook) in a tradeoff between democracy and growth.
The Soviet Union, it was argued, had grown faster than the countries of the West, but
in order to do so had jettisoned basic democratic rights. Later, with the enormous
success of the East Asian economies in the 1960s and 1970s, the lack of full participa-
tory democracy in many of the most successful countries was once again seen as reflect-
ing these tradeoffs.
A subject of this importance has not escaped the statisticians’ close scrutiny, with
the kind of ambiguity that we have come to expect from such cross-sectional and time-
series analyses—compounded by severe measurement problems.1 The host of factors
that affect growth and that interact with each other make it difficult to identify with
clarity the precise role of any particular factor. Even if we could establish a positive
correlation, it would be necessary to ascertain a causality: does democracy promote
growth or does growth promote democracy? If democracy is a “luxury” good, then
those with higher incomes, or who see their incomes rising faster, will want more of
this “luxury.”
While the data may leave open the question of the precise relationship between the
variables, the data—and the Soviet experiences—have made it clear that there is not
the strong kind of tradeoff once envisioned. Countries can strive for openness and par-
ticipation without fear that it will hamper development. Furthermore, research at both
the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels has provided considerable insight into
some of the ingredients that contribute to successful long-term growth. I will argue
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that broadly participatory processes (such as “voice,” openness, and transparency)
promote truly successful long-term development. This is not to suggest that those
processes guarantee success, or that there are no risks inherent in these processes.
Some societies that are highly participatory, at least in formal structure, have failed to
achieve development success. But it does mean that an understanding of the central-
ity of open, transparent, and participatory processes in sustainable development helps
us to design policies—strategies and processes—that are more likely to lead to long-
term economic growth and that reinforce the strengths of the processes themselves.
I shall relate these lessons to the comprehensive development paradigm that is
emerging,2 and more broadly, to the transformation of the world’s economy from an
industrial economy to a knowledge economy.3
2. Participation and the Transformation of Society
The comprehensive development paradigm sees development as a transformative
movement. As I put it in my Prebisch Lecture (1998a) last fall:
Development represents a transformation of society, a movement from 
traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of 
dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to
more “modern” ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies
is the acceptance of the world as it is; the modern perspective recognizes
change, it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions
that, for instance, reduce infant mortality, increase lifespans, and increase
productivity.
The comprehensive development paradigm contrasts with the dominant paradigm
of the past half-century, which focused more narrowly on certain economic, or even
more narrowly, allocative issues. It was argued that if only one could increase the
supply of capital and the efficiency of resource allocations, development would occur.
There is, in this sense, a close proximity in perspective between my predecessors as
chief economist of the World Bank—Hollis Chenery, say, on the one hand, represent-
ing the modern evolution of the planning approach, and Anne Krueger, say, on the
other hand, focusing on the reliance of market mechanisms. They disagreed on how
best to improve the efficiency of resource allocations and to increase the level of invest-
ment, but they agreed that these were the central aspects of a growth strategy.
Since then we have come to see these perspectives as too narrow: they may be nec-
essary conditions (and even that has been questioned), but they are far from sufficient.
We now realize that “a dual economy is not a developed economy.”4 That is, it may be
possible to raise productivity and even change mindsets within an enclave of the
economy without achieving a true development transformation of the society as a
whole.
The inadequacy of the traditional, narrowly economic approach has been highlighted
by the experience in Russia and many of the other economies in transition. Accord-
ing to the standard model, the former socialist regime, with its central planning (which
by necessity was informationally inefficient), distorted prices, and attenuated in-
centives, led to outputs that were markedly below the economy’s potential output.
Reforms—privatization, free market prices, decentralization—even if not perfectly
implemented, should have moved the economy far closer to its potential, and output
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should have risen. Since at the same time defense expenditures were cut back drasti-
cally, consumption should have increased markedly (unless savings increased—which
did not happen). But in fact, output and consumption in most of the former socialist
countries remains markedly below their levels of a decade ago, when the transition
began. Part of the explanation lies in the destruction of organizational capital; part lies
in the fact that far more than privatization is required to make an effective market
economy; but yet another part of the explanation lies in the destruction of the already
weak social capital, manifested in the growth of the so-called mafia.
If a change in mindset is at the center of development, then it is clear that attention
needs to be shifted to how to affect such changes in mindset.5 Such changes cannot be
“ordered” or forced from the outside, however well-intentioned the outsiders may be.6
Change has to come from within. The kinds of open and extensive discussions that are
central to participatory processes are, I suspect, the most effective way of ensuring that
the change in mindset occurs not only within a small elite, but reaches deep down in
society. Indeed, there is a whole tradition that identifies “government by discussion”
as key.7
The Broad Range of Participation
In this paper, I will use the term “participation” in the broadest sense, to encompass
transparency, openness, and voice in both public and corporate settings. There are a
variety of institutional arrangements that are consistent with “participation” in this
sense. And the term “participatory processes” refers not just to those processes by
which decisions are made in national governments, but also to processes used at local
and provincial levels, at the workplace, and in capital markets.
This brings me to an important point: from this comprehensive development per-
spective, I would argue that participation does not refer simply to voting.8 Participa-
tory processes must entail open dialog and broadly active civic engagement, and it
requires that individuals have a voice in the decisions that affect them.9
Processes, not just outcomes, are key to this broader interpretation of participation.
The stress on processes is a natural outgrowth not only of the increasing emphasis on
equity, but also of our greater recognition of agency problems. That is to say, we now
recognize the great importance of potential discrepancies between the actions taken
by a party (the government, for example) and the interests of those that the party 
is supposed to serve.10 A government that engages in secrecy, making it impossible 
for citizens to have informed opinions about policies that are critical to their lives and
the well-being of their country, weakens accountability and the quality of decision-
making.11 A government that controls TV stations—often the way that a majority of
the population becomes informed—or one that allows a small oligarchy to control the
media also undermines accountability. Over the short term, a country may be able to
engage in a meaningful national dialog on its future evolution without free elections;
but in the long run, the dissonance may become too great. The legitimacy of those in
decision-making positions will depend not only on their actions being in accord with
these “democratic sentiments,” but also on those positions being attained through
open, electoral processes. While “buying elections” is almost everywhere a source of
opprobrium—votes cannot or at least should not be traded in the marketplace as 
if they were a commodity12—it has been argued that the way electoral campaigns are
run in many Western countries amounts to little more than “buying votes.” Campaign
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contributions are required to “persuade” voters (via 30-second sound bites), and those
providing the funds have undue influence in policy formulation.13
In many countries, an absence of rule of law and a lack of transparency both weaken
the economy and undermine participatory processes. In some countries, for instance,
while there are “rules” designed to ensure fair treatment of all, the rich and powerful
have special access to the seats of political power and use that influence to obtain for
themselves special favors and exemptions from the rules. They may also “buy” special
access to the legislative and executive branches of government, thereby obtaining rules
and regulations that are of benefit to them.
The adverse impacts of these policies on economic growth have been well docu-
mented. There is evidence, for example, that secure property rights and the rule of
law—which tend to go hand in hand with a system of effective checks and balances—
are associated with higher levels of investment and growth.14 In addition, recent
research has shown that countries earn multiple benefits when they adopt good poli-
cies—which include open, transparent governance—and avoid the kinds of distorted
policies that are associated with preferential treatment of special interests. Not only is
growth faster, but foreign aid is also more effective in such contexts.15
Concentrations of economic power and wealth will almost inevitably be translated
into attempts at political influence. The question is, what can be done about this? Part
of any strategy is to limit these concentrations of wealth and economic power. This
provides part of the justification for redistributive taxation, and especially inheritance
taxation. It also provides part of the motivation for the antitrust laws enacted in the
United States at the end of the last century. More broadly, Thomas Jefferson, the third
president of the United States, the author of the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence, and a great believer in democratic institutions, argued for the importance of
smallholder agriculture if the newly founded American democracy was to flourish.
Today, this view translates into active government support for small and medium-size
enterprises. Part of the intent of the corporate restructuring currently going on in
Korea is to limit the reach of this economic power; but there are concerns that in the
process of rationalization of industry, concentrations of power in certain industries may
actually increase. The temporary gains in efficiency may, I suggest, be more than offset
by the inefficiencies introduced by excessive market power—and even if that were not
the case, one should raise questions about the potential adverse effects on participa-
tion and openness.
There is a second prong to the strategy: strengthening the “checks” on abuses of this
power and influence. This prescription encompasses at least three elements. The first
is to strengthen civil society, as a source of countervailing power—from political
parties, to unions, to consumer groups, to think tanks, and to a variety of other NGOs.
In the parlance of modern economics, ensuring participatory processes, and promot-
ing the public good more broadly, is itself a public good. As with other public goods,
there will be too little provision of such participatory processes in the absence of public
support. A strong civil society is an important element in a strategy of implementing
meaningful democratic reforms.
Second, governments should not only increase transparency, but also recognize that
there exists what I have termed the basic “right to know.” Citizens have a right to know
what the government is doing and why. They have a right to know if “exceptions” are
made to certain rules and regulations. Again, to refer to the legal structure with which
I am most familiar, the Freedom of Information Act has provided a way of enforcing
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at least a modicum of the citizens’ right to know. Third, societies should extend citi-
zens’ rights to legal recourse, to sue. The United States recognized that political pres-
sures might be brought to bear to induce governments not to act to break up
monopolies and prevent anticompetitive practices, and as a result, the antitrust laws
provided that any injured party could sue for triple damages. Though the law has been
interpreted too narrowly and occasionally abused in the United States, such civil reme-
dies seem particularly desirable in economies burdened by a history of large enter-
prises exercising excessive political influence. These are minimal steps in ensuring
government accountability and the rule of law.
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency
Many of the issues I have just discussed are relevant not only to governments, but also
to the governance of corporations. Corporations are public institutions: they collect
funds from the “public” and invest them in productive assets. Workers too are stake-
holders in corporations; given imperfections in labor mobility, a worker who is mis-
treated or fired cannot costlessly turn to other options (as he or she might in idealized
neoclassical models).The managers of a corporation are in a fiduciary position of trust.
Even if they are large shareholders, their actions affect others, from minority share-
holders to bondholders to workers. While contractual arrangements between the 
corporations and each of these parties may delimit the scope of action of managers,
the managers still have considerable room for action.
Laws affecting governance (and their implementation) have implications for both
equity and efficiency. If minority shareholders or bondholders cannot be ensured fair
treatment, they will not be willing to turn funds over to the corporation, and its growth
will be limited, or else the firm will have to turn to banks as a source of finance. But
even this recourse to bank finance has its limits: as leverage increases, the risk of bank-
ruptcy increases. And if many firms in the economy have high leverage, then the
economy as a whole may be threatened with a financial crisis, the costs of which may
be borne by taxpayers and workers, not just the firm and its lenders. A strong legal
system providing for corporate governance is essential to an effective capital market.
And a strong bank regulatory system is essential if banks are not to provide the high
levels of leverage that put the entire economy at risk.
Let me be clear: these are issues that involve both economics and participatory
processes. For if businesses are allowed to delay the building of the necessary legal and
regulatory framework or to subvert their effective implementation—because of insuf-
ficient participation by average citizens in decision-making—then those citizens will
face adverse consequences that clearly are not of their own making.
While the legal system must, for instance, entail both strong protection of minority
shareholders and the kinds of “fair trading” provisions incorporated in typical securi-
ties and exchange regulations, it must go beyond that, to ensure transparency and
accountability. There need to be both civil and criminal actions, for instance, associated
with fraud. Civil action, and the threat of it, can help make up for weaknesses or cor-
ruption in state supervision and enforcement: where civil action is possible, there are
far more actors in the economy who have an incentive and a right to ensure enforce-
ment of laws.
Today, the issues that I have discussed in this and the preceding section are 
recognized to be central to the success of an economy even under the narrower objec-
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tive of maximizing economic growth. As the 1997 World Development Report showed
forcefully, if governments are not transparent, countries will fail to attract investment
and growth will slow down. The recent World Bank report on Aid Effectiveness16 rein-
forced the conclusions about public governance as a contributor to growth. Recent
events have suggested that corporate governance is also quite important; without a
modicum of transparency and accountability in the corporate sector, investment and
growth may lag.As Jim Wolfensohn has recently remarked,“free markets cannot work
behind closed doors.”
Making Change Acceptable, and the Acceptance of Change
As I emphasized in my Prebisch Lecture (1998a), development requires a change in
mindset, and in particular, an acceptance of (and indeed a seeking out of 
productivity-enhancing) change. Change is often threatening—and sufficiently risk-
averse individuals are willing to pass up opportunities for expected gain to avoid the
downside risks. Participatory processes ensure that these concerns are not only heard,
but also addressed; as a result, these processes dissipate much of the resistance to
change. Consider an example that is particularly relevant in a time of globalization. As
one who supports lowering trade barriers, I am nonetheless dismayed to note that all
too often ardent free-trade advocates cavalierly dismiss the opponents, including those
who stand to lose by free trade, and refer to them as “special interests” trying to protect
their existing “rents.” But among those hurt by trade reforms will be many who will
lose their jobs; if the economy is suffering under an unemployment rate of 10% or
more, there is a great risk of extended unemployment. And if the society lacks an ade-
quate safety net, the unemployed worker risks true impoverishment, with disastrous
effects on the lives of all family members. What is of concern to the worker is not just
his loss of “rents,” but the loss of his family’s livelihood. Those experts who are not dis-
ciplined by having to be accountable to the citizenry too often ignore this. Inclusive
processes make it more likely that these legitimate concerns will be addressed. In this
way, they can ensure greater equality, and even allow more efficient outcomes—given
that the loss in output from extended periods of unemployment may far outweigh the
losses associated with the inefficient use of resources.
Participation is thus essential to effect the systemic change in mindset associated
with the development transformation, and to engender policies that make change—
which is at the center of development—more acceptable.And because individuals have
had a voice in shaping the changes, in making them more acceptable, change is likely
to be accepted or even embraced, rather than reversed at the first opportunity.
Participation and Project Effectiveness
I have argued that participation is necessary for a fully effective, society-wide devel-
opment transformation. Recent research has also begun to provide evidence for this
point at the grassroots level, demonstrating the benefits of participation in develop-
ment projects.17 It is not only that such participation brings to the project relevant
information that outside development agencies (or even governments) are not likely
to have. Participation also brings with it commitment, and commitment brings with it
greater effort—the kind of effort that is required to make the project successful.18 For
example, schools in which parents have a voice may be more successful partly because
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such participation engenders parental involvement in the school—and in their chil-
dren’s work.Water projects in which there has been more community participation are
more likely to be successful, because participation will help support the kind of long-
term maintenance that is required to keep them effective.
The Knowledge Economy and Participation
One of the major changes facing the developed and less developed world is the growth
of the “knowledge economy.” Elsewhere, I and others have argued that the knowledge
economy will lead to a change in the ways of organizing production (and society more
generally), changes which give rein to greater participation of individuals in decision-
making. Indeed, success in the knowledge economy—whether at the firm level or at
the level of the society—will require such change. Tayloristic vertical structures were
designed to enforce and coordinate certain physical behaviors while knowledge-based
work organization involves greater recognition of the autonomy and self-direction of
the mind. Knowledge is best acquired not by passive rote memorization but by the
active involvement of the learner. Learning is by doing, not by watching or memoriz-
ing. These activist principles were embodied, for example, in John Dewey’s pragmatic
philosophy of education.19
To foster the active involvement of the learner, the motivation should ideally be
intrinsic to the activity, not a superadded carrot or stick. While external incentives can
modify short-term behavior, they usually will only temporarily override rather than
change the internal system of motivation. When the extrinsic incentives are removed,
behavior reverts to the previous motives. All of these principles are fundamental for
the knowledge-based transformation of a developing country. “Best practices” or
reforms that are imposed on a country through conditionality (“carrots and sticks”)
may very well fail to produce lasting change. They will tend to undermine people’s
incentives to develop their own capacities and weaken their confidence in using their
own intelligence. There is a real danger that an external development agency, instead
of acting as a catalyst or midwife to empower change, will only short-circuit people’s
learning activities and reinforce their feelings of impotence. The external incentives
may temporarily overpower the springs of action that are native to the institutional
matrix of the country, but that will probably not induce any lasting institutional
reforms.
Broad participation in the vital activities of a developing society, like shop-floor par-
ticipation in a company, is at least helpful, and perhaps even necessary to foster a
lasting transformation. Active involvement brings commitment to the lessons being
learned and ownership of the results. Participation and involvement is not just a matter
for government officials or managers; it needs to reach deeper to include those who
are often excluded and who are key to the strengthening of social and organizational
capital.20 Outside experts can encourage “ownership” of “best policies” through per-
suasion, but the degree of ownership is likely to be much greater if those who must
carry out the policies are actively involved in the process of shaping and adapting, if
not reinventing these policies in the country itself.
Success in a knowledge-based economy will also require a highly educated citizenry,
with strong higher-level cognitive skills, and it will require an effective, and decentral-
ized, communications network, like the Internet. Both of these enhance the possibili-
ties of more effective participation, and make it more difficult to suppress it.
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Participatory Processes and the Effectiveness of Decisions
I began this paper by referring to the debates earlier in this century concerning the
tradeoff between democracy and development. Underlying that debate was the
hypothesis that participatory processes inhibited the kind of quick decision-making
required for rapid economic growth. Supporters of this view sometimes make an
analogy to the military, a highly hierarchical organization in which prices play little
role. Few have suggested the use of market mechanisms for the allocation of scarce
military resources in the middle of a war. Presumably, there is a belief that over short
periods of time and for well-defined objectives, centralized control may be a more
effective organizational form.21
Earlier in this century, rapid industrialization was viewed very much in the same
terms: resources had to be marshaled quickly, which made the military model an attrac-
tive one to many societies. The Soviet Union, for example, saw time as of the essence.
With the state and society threatened by hostile outside forces, its leaders felt that
delay would be highly costly, and therefore development had to be imposed from
above at rapid speed—and, as it turned out, at great cost.
There has been regrettably little work defining clearly the circumstances under
which hierarchical decision-making is more effective than decentralized market mech-
anisms (see Stiglitz, 1975; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). It appears that while markets may
work far more efficiently in the long run, there may be short-run circumstances—often
entailing dramatic changes in the direction of resource allocation, such as when a
country goes to war—in which market mechanisms are either too slow or too unreli-
able. Certainly, the experience of extended periods of unemployment and underuti-
lization of capacity—as illustrated by the Great Depression, and perhaps by the
frequent financial crises which have plagued the world’s economies over the past
quarter century22—suggests that market mechanisms do not always work quickly to
allocate resources efficiently.
Open, participatory processes may result in delay. Take an example from my own
country, the United States. It has been more than two decades since changes in demog-
raphy and in the pace of productivity increase made it apparent that the US social
insurance system was not financially viable. And yet, until recently, the political
processes have not found it possible to begin to address the underlying problems—
even in the case of solutions that appear to be supported by almost all experts, such
as correcting the bias in the cost of living adjustment.
But as maddeningly slow as open political processes sometimes seem to be, it is not
clear that less participation yields results any more quickly on average. Consider how
different types of governments might react when faced with an insolvent banking
system.An autocratic government may indeed move quickly and effectively to address
the problem, if it chooses to pursue the best interests of society. But if instead it is
beholden to financial-sector leaders and fears losing their support, the government may
well use public funds to keep a sinking system afloat for as long as possible, before
finally being forced into real reform. Compared with the latter case, a participatory
political system—one that represents the interests of depositors and taxpayers as well
as moneyed interests—might well mobilize more quickly to confront the problem.23
In any event, offsetting any potential costs of openness and participation are, I
believe, their overwhelming advantages. Most of the literature has focused on the
advantages of decentralizing decision-making, which—if done right—can give more
170 Joseph E. Stiglitz
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002
people a chance to participate in those decisions.24 I do not want to review here all the
arguments—the lower variability of decision quality that comes with decentralized
decisions;25 the fact that rejected projects get a “second chance,” which implies that
fewer good projects (ideas) are rejected;26 or the opportunity for experimentation and
learning that comes with decentralization.
Participation and Political Sustainability
But I do want to dwell for a moment on an argument for participatory processes that
has perhaps received too little attention. Earlier, I argued that such processes make
change more acceptable and more accepted. When democratic processes work well
(that is, when the majority does not simply impose its wishes on the minority, or con-
versely), they entail a process of consensus-building.This means that once a new policy
has been adopted, it can better weather the vicissitudes of the political process.27 For
example, India’s economic reforms of the past decade were not imposed from the
outside, but were adopted from within, and in a way that has engendered broad support
on the basic tenets. As a result, most of the key reforms have been sustained, even as
governments have changed. More generally, when a society adopts reforms after a
process of consensus-building, the political debate can move on to other issues—such
as the next steps in reform—without feeling a continuous need to revisit prior deci-
sions. By contrast, when there is a perception that the reforms were imposed from
outside, the reforms themselves become the subject of political debate, lessening their
sustainability.
3. Economic and Social Development
Too often, development is interpreted as being synonymous with economic develop-
ment, the increase in per capita GDP. To be sure, one of the key factors differentiat-
ing more from less developed countries is per capita income. And increases in per
capita income are clearly helpful for improving health and education, and for making
it possible to pursue a host of other objectives that require resources. Figures 1 and 2
show that, by and large, countries with higher per capita incomes also have higher
“social indicators.” But while the two tend to move together, there is far from perfect
correlation: certain countries and provinces (like Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, and Kerala)
that have pursued active pro-poor social policies have managed to achieve social indi-
cators that are far better than the norm for those at their per capita income. Korea has
long shown similar trends, educating its children at far higher rates than we would have
naively predicted based on income levels. Conversely, other countries that have failed
to mind these social concerns have health and education levels far below what would
be expected for a country at their level of income.
As I argued in my WIDER Lecture (1998c), we need to broaden our objectives,
beyond an increase in per capita GDP, for instance, to sustainable and equitable devel-
opment. Here, I want to emphasize another aspect, one that both has intrinsic value
and is necessary for the attainment of many of these other objectives. I will call this
aspect “social development,” by which I mean the ability of a society to peacefully
resolve conflicts and to address amicably sources of common concern when interests
differ. Societies in which there is a high level of violence, either within the family or
the community, would in these terms be marked by a low level of social development.
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Similarly, societies that suffer an extended “gridlock”—where important issues cannot
be addressed over long periods of time because conflicting positions cannot be
resolved, would also, in these terms, be marked by a low level of social development.
More broadly, social development entails a greater sense of trust and responsibility—
such as a credit culture, in which those who borrow “expect” to pay back the lender—
a higher level of social capital, and a greater “internalization” of some of the important
externalities (such as those associated with the environment).28
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Figure 2. Secondary School Enrollment and GDP per Capita, 1995
Little need be said about the direct value of “social development”—in holding down
crime, for example. The costs of violence in socially less developed societies go well
beyond expenditures directed at protecting oneself against it; the threat of violence
also gives rise to considerable anxiety and uncertainty, even if neither can adequately
be assigned a price tag. But here, I want to focus not on this direct value, but on the
relationship between social and economic development, as well as the impact of open,
participatory, and transparent processes on that relationship.
Social Development Promotes Economic Development
Social development enhances economic development. Typically, “social” enforcement
(reputation) mechanisms are more efficient than are “explicit” legal enforcement
mechanisms. That is, it is more cost-effective if transactions take place in an environ-
ment in which business people have some confidence that they will not need to sue
each time to have a contract enforced. Recent growth research has seemed to bear out
this contention at the economy-wide level, showing that trust and shared civic norms
are associated with better economic performance.29 Now that the development of
financial institutions is widely recognized as an essential ingredient in a development
strategy, a credit culture—that is, a socially developed culture that expects the repay-
ment of debts, whether or not legal enforcement is imminent—is increasingly being
recognized as contributing to financial depth. Similarly, both foreign and domestic busi-
ness people will shy away from investing in an economy with a high level of crime, cor-
ruption, and violence,30 all symptoms of low levels of social development.
But Economic Development Often Undermines Social Development
The problem is that in the process of economic development, countries often regress
in terms of social development. Social sanctions that previously worked well to inter-
nalize externalities within a community lose their potency when labor becomes highly
mobile and when communities themselves become fragile. Social capital may deterio-
rate, before the country is able to establish the kinds of less personalized social capital
associated with more advanced industrialized countries.
Economic Policies that Fail to Pay Attention to the Social Dimension May Make
Matters Worse
Often, poor policy design has exacerbated this tendency for economic growth and
change to fray the social fabric. I view with particular concern the increases in unem-
ployment that are often associated with “adjustment.” When workers are deprived of
the opportunity to be meaningful participants in the community by working—when,
through no fault of their own, they simply cannot find work—they lose self-esteem.
Welfare is no substitute for work; and in any case, many developing countries lack even
an adequate social safety net, so that the adverse consequences of unemployment are
truly dire.
Other than impoverishment, unemployment can give rise to other social ills. As the
Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker has pointed out, crime stems at least in
part from the expectation of economic gains.31 Those prospective gains loom larger,
and the threat of punishment provokes less fear, when a person’s other options for
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earning a living vanish. This is not to say that the typical unemployed worker turns to
a life of crime, but only to note that despair and blocked opportunity can tear at the
social fabric and reduce willingness to abide by laws. Since the resulting rise in crime
levels is likely to exact significant economic and psychic costs, as I noted before, poli-
cymakers must take these costs into account when weighing the advantages of con-
tractionary adjustment policies.
Participatory Processes and the Restoration of Social Capital
Open, transparent, and participatory processes can play an important role in preserv-
ing or, if necessary, re-establishing social capital. Participation itself can help create a
sense of community, a sine qua non for a high level of social capital. If individuals
believe that they have had meaningful participation in the decisions that are affecting
them, they will be more willing to accept changes, even if they are adversely affected.
But if they believe that those changes have been imposed on them, either by outsiders
or by illegitimate governments who have not taken their concerns into account, then
resentment is more likely to mount and to lead to socially destructive outcomes.
A minimal sense of community entails making sure those that are most disadvan-
taged—particularly those who face starvation or face severe medical problems—are
taken care of, in at least a minimal way. The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Amartya
Sen, has stressed that democratic societies simply do not allow famines to occur.32
Perhaps this is a low bar for a community to hurdle, but it is a crucial one nonetheless.
Communities that do not allow such severe impoverishment are more likely to be
trusted by a worker who faces potentially disruptive change because she will feel that
her concerns are taken at least somewhat into account.
Open dialog with a free and vigorous press, with a diversified ownership of media
(including TV) is, I would argue, essential for the development of this sense of com-
munity. With secrecy, and without such open dialog, there will always be the suspicion
that decisions were made not on the basis of “community” interests, but on the basis
of “special interests” (and often these suspicions are justified).
Let me elaborate briefly on this point. The problem is that with secrecy, individuals
cannot tell from the outcomes alone whether their interests have received due atten-
tion. They observe outcomes that are clearly disadvantageous to them. They are told,
for instance, that matters would have been even worse had not the given policies been
pursued, or that in future things will be better. They may suspect that the interests of
others—whether well-placed domestic business leaders or foreign lenders—may have
been placed above the interests of less well-connected domestic actors, such as workers.
In such circumstances, ensuring fair processes is essential; but if decisions are made in
secret—or if there is not even full disclosure of the terms of an agreement—there will
be little confidence that the processes were themselves fair.
Economic Development can Promote Social Development
While economic development in the past has often undermined social development,
economic development today can serve to reinforce social development and 
participatory processes. For an essential ingredient of economic development is
improved education and better communications. The latter enables individuals to be
better informed about issues in a timely way, and the former puts individuals in a better
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position to use that information to form intelligent views concerning the merits of
alternatives.
Well-designed education systems, which can both contribute to and be financed by
economic development, have also played an important role in building social cohesion.
Korea’s education system is an excellent example. Although Korea has recognized the
need to reform certain features of that system in the 1990s, over the past several
decades the system has done much to reinforce social cohesion, in my view. The avail-
ability of mass education and the meritocratic principles underlying the system have
strengthened confidence in the equity of social outcomes, in the process deflating any
tendency toward social envy and dissent. On the flip side, poorly designed education
systems that reinforce social stratification may well undermine a broad sense of social
cohesion and impede social development.
4. Social Cohesion, Economic Policy, and the Comprehensive 
Development Paradigm
The central argument of this paper has been that open, transparent, and participatory
processes are important ingredients in the development transformation—important
both for sustainable economic development and for social development that should
be viewed as an end in itself and as a means to more rapid economic growth.
Nowhere are such processes more important than in economic policymaking. While,
to be sure, there are certain policies that make everybody worse off or everybody
better off, in the real world many of the most important policy decisions entail choices
among policies that cannot be so easily rejected or embraced. That is to say, there are
real tradeoffs among policies: not only do some people gain more than others, but some
actually lose.
Many have remarked at the increase in social tensions that followed upon the Latin
American crisis of the 1980s. In many cases, education expenditures were cut back, and
inequality and unemployment increased. We need not engage here in the debate
whether adjustment policies exacerbated these problems, or whether they would have
been worse, but for the adjustment assistance and the policies that accompanied that
assistance. But what is clear is that, all too often, the process by which the decisions
were made did not comport well with open, transparent, and participatory principles:
not only were negotiations that led to adjustment typically conducted in secret, but
even the outcomes sometimes were not fully disclosed.
My concern here is not only reality but also perception. Indeed, perceptions are suf-
ficiently widespread to at least suggest that there may be some reality in them, and in
any case, the perceptions themselves become part of the reality with which we have to
deal. The widespread perception that I encounter is that adjustment packages of the
1980s often did not take into account as fully as they might have the social and eco-
nomic consequences of the policies on the poor. In the East Asian crisis, these con-
cerns have been compounded by another perception: that the adjustment packages
went beyond actions that were necessary to deal with the crises. (Whether correct or
not, this view has drawn enormous attention. Martin Feldstein, for instance, in his
highly influential Foreign Affairs article, argued that the conditions on adjustment
packages went not only beyond matters of direct concern to the crisis, but even into
concerns that were more properly political than economic. In his view, these questions
clearly should have been decided through participatory political processes.33)
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This perception—that economic decision-making on certain key questions has been
less than fully participatory—has been reinforced by the secrecy in which negotiations
often occur. Without prejudging whether secrecy is essential for market stability and
for the successful conduct of negotiations (but see my Oxford Amnesty Lecture
(1999b) for my reservations on these arguments for secrecy), the adverse consequences
should be clear: as I have already noted, there will always be a suspicion that moneyed
and vested interests, not common welfare, have dictated solutions. This problem is exa-
cerbated when top decision-makers do not even go through the motions of weighing
choices among various plausible alternatives. Instead, when decision-making is
shielded from the public view, the recommended action is often adopted as if it were
the only appropriate and feasible action—though it is perfectly transparent to most
citizens that that is not the case.34
Whether we like it or not, whether it is justified or not, there is now in much of the
world a legacy of suspicion and doubt. Opponents see in development conditionality
an echo of the colonial bonds that their countries threw off only one or two genera-
tions ago. And while conditionality is at least widely perceived to have undermined
transparency and participation, there is little evidence that it has achieved much in
terms of better policies.35 The results should perhaps not be that surprising, given that
policies imposed through conditionality are seldom politically sustainable. Indeed, in
many cases, as we have noted, the policies are at least perceived to have contributed
to the country’s problems, undermined meaningful participation, and led to further
breakdown of social cohesion. For example, privatization in Russia has not resulted in
an effective market economy, and it increased inequality without any compensating
increase in productivity or growth. Rather than providing incentives for wealth cre-
ation, it provided incentives for asset-stripping—with huge movements of “private”
capital abroad. Moreover, the way that privatization was carried out resulted in media
concentrations that undermined the viability of broad, informed public participation.
Of course, none of these “failures” were themselves explicitly part of the recommen-
dations, but conditionality may have done little to forestall them. While privatization
was often a condition that was both explicit and highly visible, far less stress was placed
on the institutional arrangements that might have mitigated these problems. Had a
more broadly participatory process arrived at a homegrown privatization scheme
which was then carried out on a schedule determined by domestic concerns, perhaps
the combined wisdom and knowledge of the citizenry could have headed off the most
egregious failures of privatization.
Those who provide funds—including both the IMF and the World Bank—must rec-
ognize that they have a fiduciary and moral responsibility to make sure that the funds
are well spent. Future generations in the borrowing country will be obligated to pay
back the loans, and unless the returns are sufficient, borrowing today will impoverish
future generations, rather than enriching them. If funds end up financing capital flight
at overvalued exchange rates, for example, it is hard to see how this enriches future
generations! (Thus, it may be argued, it is not so much whether conditions are attached
to making funds available that matters, but what those conditions are, and how they
are arrived at.)
These are among the concerns that motivated the World Bank to seek new ways of
working with developing countries. In the Comprehensive Development Framework
that President Wolfensohn outlined in his annual speech in 1999, he proposed a new
approach to development assistance. Not only did it emphasize the holistic nature of
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the development process, but it strove to create a new process, one that would entail
a new set of relationships, not only between the Bank and the country, but within the
country itself and between the country and all donor agencies. Central is the notion
that the “country (not just the government) must be in the driver’s seat.”
One of the important results emerging from recent research on aid is not only that
conditionality is ineffective, but that aid is highly effective in good policy environments.
Moreover, one must recognize that funds are fungible: in effect, money goes to overall
budgetary support. It makes sense therefore to give assistance to countries that have
adopted good policies; a comprehensive development framework enhances the likeli-
hood that the country will adopt such policies and sustain them. The emphasis on fun-
gibility does not mean an end to project lending: budgetary assistance needs to be
complemented with “knowledge” and “technical assistance,” and project lending is
often the most effective way to combine the two. But one must take into account the
overall framework for that lending. In developing their strategies, countries may not
approach matters exactly as international bureaucrats—unfettered by political con-
straints—would. I am not sure on whose judgment I would more often rely, particu-
larly if my objective is the long-run political sustainability of reforms. Those within a
country may be in a better position to make the difficult judgments on how best to
create a sustainable consensus behind reforms. No decisions are more important than
those that affect the economy. Clearly, the citizens need to be informed of the conse-
quences of those choices—and on this there is often debate, even among so-called
experts. No institution, whether domestic or international, has a monopoly on wisdom,
and it is imperative that there be a full articulation of the evidence concerning the con-
sequences of alternative policies.
5. Concluding Remarks
I have here discussed mainly general principles. But these principles translate into con-
crete actions. I illustrated this with one example in the previous section: how these
principles necessitate a change in the way external assistance interacts with develop-
ing countries. I have also stressed the importance of the processes by which decisions
are made—how consensus-building, open dialog, and the promotion of an active civil
society are more likely to result in politically sustainable economic policies and to spur
the development transformation.36
There are many other examples of how these principles can guide development
action. In some cases, the perspectives put forth here reinforce arguments central to
development policy in recent years: the importance of education, and, in particular,
the education of women; the need for better communications, which can best be 
promoted by encouraging a competitive telecommunications sector; the central role 
of “good government” (inducing a lack of corruption); and the importance of the 
rule of law and of reducing scope for discretionary actions in a strategy to reduce 
corruption.
The view that I have offered here—with its emphasis on the simultaneous pursuit
of social and economic development—places renewed emphasis on the need for gov-
ernments to pursue policies that maintain full employment. There are many dimen-
sions to this: avoiding crises—which necessitates strong governmental regulation of
financial institutions and the pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies—and respond-
ing to crises in ways that minimize the length and depth of unemployment.
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It also places a renewed emphasis on the importance of competition policy. The
origins of competition policy, it will be recalled, lie not only in the concern for pro-
moting efficiency, but also the desire to avoid the concentrations of economic power
that can corrode transparency and participatory processes. Nowhere are these con-
cerns more important than in the media.
The comprehensive approach to development also raises new concerns: the struc-
ture of education systems, for instance, may lead to or perpetuate social stratification,
undermining social cohesion, or it can be a key ingredient in nation building. More
than just “efficiency in the delivery of services” is at stake. Given the importance of
consensus formation, capacity building—creating the capacity for those within a
country to forge their own development strategies and to have an active debate about
the central tenets—needs to move more towards the center.
Though democracy has a long tradition—in the West, it dates back at least to the
Greek city-states—it has been slow to evolve and remains highly fragile. It was only
in the twentieth century that universal suffrage became the norm. Many countries have
been slow to grant those basic rights that I believe to be so necessary for an effective
participatory system—the right to a free press, free speech, the right to organize to
pursue common objectives (both in general, and for workers in particular). Many gov-
ernments continue not to recognize the people’s fundamental “right to know,” pursu-
ing secrecy well beyond the domain where national security requires it.
Democracy, and participatory processes more generally, is also fragile. Repeatedly,
we have seen high levels of social disorder lead to calls for “strong” (read “antidemo-
cratic”) government to restore the basic foundations of law and order without which
individuals cannot live and work together. We have seen how economic policies, and
the manner in which they are adopted, can contribute either to social cohesion or to
social disorder. Countries that have experienced hyperinflation are well aware of the
economic, and thus social, disruption to which the failure of the basic market mecha-
nisms can give rise. But too often the wrong lesson has been read from these experi-
ences: hyperinflation is seen as the underlying problem, and therefore it has to be
avoided at all costs. But the real cause is the huge disruptions in the social and eco-
nomic order that result from hyperinflation; therefore if policies designed to prevent
inflation at the same time contribute directly to social and economic disorder, the con-
sequences will be equally disastrous. (Indeed, Keynes, in his The Economic Conse-
quences of the Peace (1920), predicted the adverse consequences of the terms of the
Versailles Treaty, well before the particular way in which those consequences would
manifest themselves became clear.)
The world has experienced financial and currency crises of increasing frequency and
severity,37 with widespread economic and social repercussions. There is a growing con-
sensus about the causes of the crises, and about the policies that must be adopted to
reduce their frequency and severity and to mitigate the consequences (developing
stronger safety nets, for example).38 But no safety net can fully replace the security
provided by an economy running at full employment. No welfare system will ever
restore the dignity that comes from work. It is imperative that countries not only imple-
ment policies that prevent crises and minimize their depth and adverse consequences,
but also that they respond to these crises in ways that maintain as high a level of
employment as possible.
But while globalization and economic change provide new challenges for sustain-
able comprehensive development, they also offer new opportunities and have made
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open, participatory, transparent processes essential for long-run success. This is as true
for the private sector as for the public. As we start the twenty-first century, there is
much to be learned from the failures of the last century. We cannot shut our eyes to
the disasters brought on by totalitarian regimes: similar disasters must be avoided at
all costs. Nor can we ignore the link between these failures and the economic and social
disorder that preceded them.
We now know more about how to manage an economy than we did 75 years ago.
We can hope that in the coming decades, we will make use of this knowledge, our broad
understanding of the development process, and the new opportunities afforded by the
changing economy to strengthen and extend development through comprehensive
strategies. In this vision, these development strategies will incorporate social as well as
economic development, arrived at through open, transparent, and participatory
processes, that extend the fruits of development in a sustainable way to all the citizens
of the developing world.
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Notes
1. For an earlier review, see “Symposia: Democracy and Development” (1993) in the Journal of
Economic Perspectives, including the article by Przeworski and Limongi.
2. See Wolfensohn (1998, 1999) and Stiglitz (1998a).
3. See Department of Trade and Industry (1998a,b) and Stiglitz (1999a).
4. See Stiglitz (1998a).
5. “All [vicious development] circles result from the two-way dependence between development
and some other factor, be it capital or entrepreneurship, education, public administration,
etc. But the circle to which our analysis has led us may perhaps lay claim to a privileged 
place in the hierarchy of these circles inasmuch as it alone places the difficulties of development
back where all difficulties of human action begin and belong: in the mind” (Hirschman, 1958,
p. 11).
6. In the West, the clear recognition of the inability to externally force a change in mindset dates
from the Reformation. “As little as another can go to hell or heaven for me, so little can he
believe or disbelieve for me; and as little as he can open or shut heaven or hell for me, so little
can he drive me to faith or unbelief” (Luther, 1942 [1523]). This insight was basic to the liberty
of conscience and the attitudes of religious tolerance fostered in Europe after the Reformation.
7. See, for example, John Stuart Mill (1972 [1859]), Walter Bagehot (1948 [1869]), James Bryce
(1959 [1888]), John Dewey (1927, 1939), Ernest Barker (1967 [1942]), Frank Knight (1947), and
Charles Lindblom (1990).
8. “In theory, the democratic method is persuasion through public discussion carried on not only
in legislative halls but in the press, private conversations and public assemblies. The substitution
of ballots for bullets, of the right to vote for the lash, is an expression of the will to substitute
the method of discussion for the method of coercion” (Dewey, 1939, p. 128).
9. See Hirschman (1970) for a discussion of “voice.”
10. Agency theory is one of the principal strands in the modern theory of the economics of
information. See, for example, Ross (1973), Stiglitz (1975), and the huge literature that followed.
The essential point is that because of imperfections of information, actions of agents are not
perfectly observable, and one cannot infer whether the agent took the “appropriate” action from
observing outputs alone.
11. See Stiglitz (1999b).
12. Some free marketeers would disagree with this proposition. For an excellent discussion of
the rationale for why voting should not be so treated, see Tobin (1970).
13. Lindblom makes this point in a particularly challenging way.“Among the defects of the exist-
ing competition of ideas, none seems more impairing and more easily remedied, given the will,
than that well-financed communications, whether well-financed by the state, by private organi-
zations, or by wealthy elites, overpower poorly financed ones. Many societies have accepted, at
least as a principle, that children should deserve an education whether their parents can afford
it or not, and that everyone deserves some forms of life-protecting medical services regardless
of ability to pay. But no society has yet grasped the importance of separating rights of commu-
nication from ability to pay” (Lindblom, 1990, p. 296).
14. See Knack and Keefer (1995) and Clague et al. (1996).
15. See World Bank (1998).
16. See World Bank (1998).
17. See Isham et al. (1995) and Isham et al. (1997).
PARTICIPATION AND COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT 181
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002
18. “But, over time, development experience has shown that when external experts alone
acquire, analyze, and process information and then present this information in reports, social
change usually does not take place; whereas the kind of ‘social learning’ that stakeholders gen-
erate and internalize during the participatory planning and/or implementation of a development
activity does enable social change” (World Bank, 1996, p. 5).
19. Dewey recognized as well the connection between political and economic conditions.“If you
wish to establish and maintain political self-government, you must see to it that conditions in
industry and finance are not such as to militate automatically against your political aim” (1939,
p. 53).
20. See Wolfensohn (1997) for a discussion of the importance of inclusion in the development
process.
21. The time-limited effectiveness of “military” methods was conveyed by Talleyrand’s quip that
one can “do anything with a bayonet except sit on it.”
22. While such crises have marked capitalism from its origins, crises appear to be more frequent
and deeper. See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren et al. (1996).
23. I am indebted to Phil Keefer for this example.
24. By “decentralization,” I refer here not just to governmental decentralization, but to any
process (including market processes) that allow larger numbers of people to have inputs into
decisions.
25. The extreme failures of the twentieth century—from Stalin to Hitler to Pol Pot—have all
arisen in totalitarian regimes. This observation is consistent with the theoretical predictions of
Sah and Stiglitz (1991).
26. See, for example, Sah and Stiglitz (1986).
27. In Japanese management practice, the slower but more effective process of participatory
decision-making is likened to careful transplantation. “It is a time-honored Japanese gardening
technique to prepare a tree for transplanting by slowly and carefully binding the roots over a
period of time, bit by bit, to prepare the tree for the shock of the change it is about to experi-
ence. This process, called nemawashi, takes time and patience, but it rewards you, if it is done
properly, with a healthy transplanted tree” (Morita, 1986, p. 158).
28. See, for example, Coleman (1988), Dasgupta (1997), Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), and
Stiglitz (1997).
29. See Knack and Keefer (1997).
30. See, for example, World Bank (1997).
31. See Becker (1968).
32. See Sen and Drèze (1990).
33. See Feldstein (1998).
34. Even if it were, a dialog behind closed doors would certainly not convince them otherwise.
35. See Chibber et al. (1995). Much of the conditionality concerns “timing”—certain actions (for
example, the privatization of a particular company) are required to occur within a particular
time horizon. Even if conditionality increased the speed of privatization slightly, the benefits of
doing so may well not be worth the cost: the economic losses from a slight delay may be small
compared to the gain from allowing the process of democratic decision-making to work its
course. And indeed, in many cases, by encouraging excessive speed, the manner in which priva-
tization has been conducted has been far from ideal. Governments have received far less than
they would have in a more orderly process, and the magnitude of economic restructuring asso-
ciated with privatization (and therefore the gains in efficiency) has been far smaller than it might
have been. In several countries, the privatization process has resulted in undermining, rather
than strengthening, confidence in market processes.
36. The late World Bank Chief Economist, Michael Bruno (1993), also argued that such
processes have been effective means of addressing issues of macro stability.
37. See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
38. See, for example, Stiglitz (1998b).
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